This is a book about the role that psychological impairment should play in a theory of criminal liability. Criminal guilt in the Anglo-American legal tradition requires both that the defendant committed some proscribed act and did so with intent, knowledge, or recklessness. The second requirement corresponds to the intuitive idea that people should not be punished for something they did not do 'on purpose' or if they 'did not realize what they were doing'. Unlike many works in this area, this (...) book addresses the automatism and insanity defences by examining the types of functional impairment that typical candidates for these defences actually suffer. What emerges is a much wider conceptual framework that allows us to understand the significance of psychological states and processes for the attribution of criminal responsibility in a manner that is logically coherent, morally defensible, and consistent with research in psychopathology. (shrink)

This major study advances an interpretation of criminal justification defences that views them as an integral component of the structure of the criminal law. Criminal law is defined here as the institutional representation of the underlying principles of political morality in a liberal society. The book extends the traditional scope of the legal and philosophical discussion of justification defences. It integrates philosophical analysis with a consideration of contemporary applications, it shows how these defences are key components of criminal law, and (...) it explores the relationship between legal and moral justification. (shrink)

American adults currently enjoy a widely accepted and legally well-settled right to refuse health care, including life sustaining treatment. Joel Feinberg provides a moral foundation for this right in liberal political theory. Feinberg's theory grounds the right to refuse in a broad right to self-determination, and it implements the right through a variable conception of voluntariness. This theory provides a plausible account that comports with the widely accepted right to refuse, commonsense, and ordinary practice. -/- Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock (...) contend, however, that Feinberg's priority for the right to self-determination is inconsistent with his variable scale of voluntariness. Although Feinberg presents his theory as one that grants categorical priority to self-determination over individual well-being, Buchanan and Brock argue that Feinberg's variable scale of voluntariness involves a balancing of self-determination and well-being. This balancing approach, which Buchanan and Brock endorse, seems to undermine the competent patient's right to refuse care because it allows concern for the patient's well-being to override that person's right to self-determination in some circumstances. Taken together, these arguments seem to suggest that we must give up either the competent patient's right to refuse treatment or the intuitively sensible variable scale. -/- In this paper, I argue that one can reconcile a categorical priority for self-determination with legal rules that incorporate a variable scale of competence. This integration requires careful examination of the practical and expressive functions of legal rules as well as of the manner in which these rules embody moral priorities. This analysis pursues specific and general projects. Specifically, it addresses the moral foundations of the legal right to refuse treatment, identifying a substantive difference between the balancing approach and the priority for self-determination that characterizes Feinberg's liberalism. Generally, it examines the types of priorities embodied by legal rules as practical decision guides and as expressions of the conventional morality represented by the law. This general project extends beyond the right to refuse treatment to the analysis of the manner in which legal rules express and apply moral priorities. (shrink)

This major study advances an interpretation of criminal justification defences that views them as an integral component of the structure of the criminal law. Criminal law is defined here as the institutional representation of the underlying principles of political morality in a liberal society. The book extends the traditional scope of the legal and philosophical discussion of justification defences. It integrates philosophical analysis with a consideration of contemporary applications, it shows how these defences are key components of criminal law, and (...) it explores the relationship between legal and moral justification. (shrink)

This is a book about the role that psychological impairment should play in a theory of criminal liability. Criminal guilt in the Anglo-American legal tradition requires both that the defendant committed some proscribed act and did so with intent, knowledge, or recklessness. The second requirement corresponds to the intuitive idea that people should not be punished for something they did not do 'on purpose' or if they 'did not realize what they were doing'. Unlike many works in this area, this (...) book addresses the automatism and insanity defences by examining the types of functional impairment that typical candidates for these defences actually suffer. What emerges is a much wider conceptual framework that allows us to understand the significance of psychological states and processes for the attribution of criminal responsibility in a manner that is logically coherent, morally defensible, and consistent with research in psychopathology. (shrink)